Empirical demand models used for counterfactual predictions and welfare analysis must be rationalizable, i.e. theoretically consistent with utility maximization by heterogeneous consumers. We show that for binary choice under general unobserved heterogeneity, rationalizability is equivalent to a pair of Slutsky-like shape-restrictions on choice-probability functions.
choice under general unobserved heterogeneity and income effects, and conversely, whether these restrictions are also sufficient for observed choice-probabilities to be rationalizable. This issue is important for logical coherency between theory and empirics and, in particular, for prediction of demand and welfare in situations involving counterfactual, i.e. previously unobserved, budget sets.
It is important in these exercises to allow for general unobserved heterogeneity, because economic theory typically does not restrict its dimension or distribution, and does not specify how it enters utility functions. To date, closed-form Slutsky conditions for rationalizability of demand under general heterogeneity were available only for continuous choice. The present paper, to our knowledge, is the first to establish them for the leading case of discrete demand, viz. binary choice.
The second goal of the present paper is a practical one. It is motivated by the fact that in empirical applications of binary choice, requiring the estimation of elasticities, welfare calculations and demand predictions, researchers typically use parsimonious functional-forms for conditional choice probabilities. This is because fully nonparametric estimation is often hindered by curse of dimensionality, the sensitivity of estimates to the choice of tuning parameters and insufficient price variation, especially in consumer data from developed countries. The question therefore arises as to whether the economic theory of consumer behavior can inform the choice of such functional forms.
Answering this question is our second objective.
Since McFadden, 1973 , discrete choice models of economic behavior have been studied extensively in the econometric literature, mostly under restrictive assumptions on utility functions and unobserved heterogeneity including, inter alia, quasi-linear preferences implying absence of income effects and/or parametrically specified heterogeneity distributions (c.f. Train, 2009 for a textbook treatment). Matzkin (1992) investigated the nonparametric identification of binary choice models with additive heterogeneity, where both the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and the functional form of utilities were left unspecified. More recently, Bhattacharya (2015 Bhattacharya ( , 2018 has shown that in discrete choice settings, welfare distributions resulting from price changes are nonparametrically point-identified from choice probabilities without any substantive restriction on preference heterogeneity, and even when preference distribution and heterogeneity dimension are not identified.
In the present paper, we consider a setting of binary choice by a population of budget-constrained consumers with general, unobserved heterogeneity. In this setting, we develop a characterization of utility maximization which takes the form of simple, closed-form shape restrictions on choice probability functions in the population. These nonparametric shape-restrictions can be consistently tested in the usual asymptotic econometric sense and are extremely easy to impose on specifications of choice-probabilities -akin to testing or imposing monotonicity of regression functions.
Most importantly, they lead to computationally simple bounds for theory-consistent demand and welfare predictions on counterfactual budgets sets -an important goal of empirical demand analysis. Interestingly, our shape-restrictions differ in form from the well-known Slutsky inequalities for continuous goods.
The above results are developed in a fully nonparametric context; nonetheless, they can help guide applied researchers intending to use simple parametric or semiparametric models. As a specific example, consider the popular probit/logit type model for binary choice of whether to buy a product or not. A standard specification is that the probability of buying depends (implicitly conditioning on other observed covariates) on its price p and the decision-maker's income y, e.g.
, where F (·) is a distribution function. We will show below that these choice-probabilities are consistent with utility maximization by a heterogenous population of consumers, if and only if γ 1 ≤ 0, and γ 1 + γ 2 ≤ 0. While the first inequality simply means that demand falls with own price (holding income fixed), the second inequality is less obvious, and constitutes an important empirical characterization of utility maximization. and Kitamura and Stoye, 2016, Sec 3.3. Furthermore, the SRP conditions are difficult to impose on parametric specifications commonly used in practical applications, they change entirely in form upon addition of new budget sets, and are cumbersome to use for demand prediction on counterfactual budgets, especially in welfare calculations that typically require simultaneous prediction on a continuous range of budget-sets. In contrast, our approach yields rationality conditions which (a) are global, in that they characterize choice probability functions, and their forms remain invariant to which and how many budget sets are observed in a dataset, and (b) are closed-form, analytic shape-restrictions, hence easy to impose, standard to test, and simple to use for counterfactual predictions of demand and welfare. As such, these shape-restrictions establish the analogs of Slutsky conditions -the cornerstone of classical demand analysis -for binary choice under general unobserved heterogeneity and income effects.
The Result
Consider a population of heterogeneous individuals, each choosing whether or not to buy an indivisible good. Let N represent the quantity of numeraire which an individual consumes in addition to the binary good. If the individual has income Y = y, and faces a price P = p for the indivisible good, then the budget constraint is N + pQ = y where Q ∈ {0, 1} represents the binary choice. Individuals derive satisfaction from both the indivisible good as well as the numeraire. Upon buying, an individual derives utility from the good but has a lower amount of numeraire y − p left; upon not buying, she enjoys utility from her outside option and a higher quantity of numeraire y. There is unobserved heterogeneity across consumers which affect their choice, and so on each budget set defined by a price p and consumer income y, there is a (structural) probability of buying, denoted by q (y, y − p); that is, if each member of the entire population were offered income y and price p, then a fraction q (y, y − p) would buy the good. It is more standard to write this choice probability as conditional on price and income, i.e., in the formq (p, y), but the equivalent q (y, y − p) expression is an important and helpful step toward obtaining closed-form rationalizability results, as will become clear below. Indeed, one can go back and forth between the two specifications becausē
. Also, for now, we implicitly condition our analysis on observed covariates, and later show how to incorporate them into the results.
Our main result establishes conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the conditional choice probability function to be generated from utility maximization by a heterogeneous population, where no a priori restriction is imposed on the dimension and functional form of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity or on the functional form of utilities.
Theorem 1 For binary choice under general heterogeneity, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The structural choice probability function q (·, ·), defined above, satisfies that (A) q (a, b) is non-increasing in a for each fixed b, and non-decreasing in b for each fixed a; (B) for each fixed b ∈ R, it holds that lim a↓−∞ q (a, b) = 1, and (C) q (a, b) is continuous in a for each fixed b.
(ii) There exists a pair of utility functions W 0 (·, η) and W 1 (·, η), where the first argument denotes the amount of numeraire, and η denotes unobserved heterogeneity, and a distribution G (·)
where (A') for each fixed η, W 0 (a, η) is continuous and strictly increasing in a, and
Intuitively, conditions (A/A') mean that having more numeraire ceteris paribus is (weakly) better for every consumer. To interpret condition (B), note that for fixed b,
. Now, since a − b = p is the price, condition (B/B') say that everyone can be persuaded to buy product 1 by making its price low enough (perhaps even negative). Condition (C/C') -the "no-tie" assumption -is standard in discrete choice models, and intuitively means that there is a continuum of tastes. Note that (A)-(C) place no restriction on income effects, including its sign.
In statement (ii), the functions W j (x, η) will correspond to the utility from choosing alternative j ∈ {0, 1} and being left with a quantity x of the numeraire, and with η denoting unobserved heterogeneity. This notation allows for the case where different vectors of unobservables enter the two utilities, i.e. where the utilities are given by u 0 (·, η 0 ) and u 1 (·, η 1 ), respectively, with
. In the proof of the above theorem, when showing (ii) implies (i), η will be allowed to have any arbitrary and unknown dimension and distribution; in showing (i) implies (ii) we will construct a scalar heterogeneity distribution that will rationalize the choice probabilities (see further discussion on this point under the heading "Observational Equivalence" in the next section).
whence (C') implies continuity of q (·, b), (B') implies that lim a↓−∞ q (a, b) = 1 for each b, and (A') implies (A).
We now show that (i) implies (ii). Note that lim a↓−∞ q (a, b) = 1 for each b implies that for any u ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ R, the set {x : q (x, b) ≥ u} is non-empty. For any fixed b ∈ R and for u ∈ [0, 1],
(1)
, and note that by construction,
We will now show that W 0 (·, V ) and W 1 (·, V ) will rationalize the choice-probabilities q (·, ·).
Indeed, given any fixed b, since q (·, b) is continuous and non-increasing, we have that for any v ∈ (0, 1),
To see why continuity is required for the last implication in (2), suppose for some v ∈ (0, 1), we
Continuity of q (·, b) rules this out, and guarantees that q (c,
Finally, by definition of q −1 (·, b) as the supremum in (1), we have that
Therefore, by (2) and (3), we have that q (a, b) ≥ v ⇐⇒ a ≤ q −1 (v, b), and thus, for V ≃ U (0, 1), it follows that
Therefore, the utility functions W 0 (a, V ) ≡ a and 
The forms of these inequalities are distinct from textbook Slutsky conditions for nonstochastic demand q * (p, y) for a continuous good, which are given by Remark 1 It is tempting to think of (4) and (5) as (6) 
B. Observational Equivalence:
The construction in our proof of (ii) ⇒ (i) shows that a rationalizable binary choice model with general heterogeneity of unspecified dimension is observationally equivalent to one where a scalar heterogeneity enters the utility function of one of the alternatives in a monotonic way, and the utility of the other alternative is non-stochastic. 2 An intuitive explanation of this equivalence is that in the binary case, choice probabilities are determined solely by the marginal distribution of reservation price (given income) for alternative 1, and not the relative ranking of individual consumers in terms of their preferences within that distribution.
So, as income varies, choice probabilities change only insofar as the marginal distribution of the reservation price changes, irrespective of how individual consumers' relative positions change within that distribution.
It is worth pointing out here that a binary choice model with additive scalar heterogeneitythe so-called ARUM model -is restrictive, and not observationally equivalent to a binary choice model with general heterogeneity. To see this, suppose choice probabilities are generated via the ARUM model, viz.
Assuming smoothness and strict monotonicity of
, W 1 (·) and W 0 (·), and thus of q (·, ·), it follows that
, from (7)
for every a and b. This equality is obviously not true for a general smooth and strictly monotone q (·, ·) satisfying Assumptions i(A)-i(C) of Theorem 1. Remark 2 The construction of q −1 (V, ·) in our proof of (ii) ⇒ (i) is unrelated to the almost sure representation of a continuous random variable X as F −1 X (U ) with U = F X (X), where F X and F
−1 X
denote the CDF and quantile function of X, and U is U (0, 1). Indeed, if we were to apply this socalled "probability-integral transform" to X = W 1 (a 1 , η) for a fixed a 1 , we will have W 1 (a 1 , η) a.s. 1 )) , where the scalar-valued uniform process U (a 1 ) ≡ F W 1 (a 1 ,η) (W 1 (a 1 , η) ) will vary with a 1 , unlike V in the proof of our theorem above, and therefore cannot represent unobserved heterogeneity in consumer preferences. In other words, our constructed q −1 (V, a 1 ) will not equal the data generating process W 1 (a 1 , η) almost surely, but the probability that q −1 (V, a 1 ) ≥ a 0 will equal the probability that W 1 (a 1 , η) ≥ W 0 (a 0 , η) for all (a 0 , a 1 ).
C. Giffen Goods: Our rationalizability condition (4) says that own price effect on average demand is negative. This condition has no counterpart in the continuous case, appears to rule out Giffen behavior and may, therefore, appear restrictive. We now show that that is not the case: indeed, Giffen goods cannot arise in binary choice models if utilities are non-satiated in the numeraire. To see this, let the utility of options 0 and 1 be given by W 0 (·, η) and W 1 (·, η) as in Theorem 1 above. Now note that if option 1 is Giffen for an η type consumer with income y, then for some prices p < p ′ she buys at price p ′ but does not buy at p. Therefore,
which is a contradiction, since W 1 (·, η) is strictly increasing. In contrast, consider a continuous good with utilities W (x, y − px, η), where x denotes the quantity of the continuous good, and W (·, ·, η) is increasing in both arguments. Now it is possible that x is bought at price p and x ′ is bought at price p ′ with p < p ′ and x < x ′ . That is, we can have
if x ′ is preferred sufficiently over x. The intuitive reason for this difference between the discrete and the continuous case is that in the former, the only non-zero option is 1. Indeed, in the continuous case, it is also not possible that W (x, y − px, η) < W (x, y − p ′ x, η) for any common x if p < p ′ .
Also, note that although Giffen behavior cannot arise in binary choice, there is no restriction on the sign of the income effect. Indeed, (4) and (5) 
where F (·) is a strictly increasing CDF, the shape restrictions of Theorem 1 amount to requiring γ 1 ≤ 0 and γ 1 + γ 2 ≤ 0. While the first inequality is intuitive, and simply says that own price effect is negative, the second condition γ 1 + γ 2 ≤ 0 is not a priori obvious, and shows the additional restriction implied by budget-constrained utility maximization. Now, applying Theorem 1, we obtain
implying the rationalizing utility functions
where V ≃ U (0, 1).
Remark 3 Note that since the restrictions γ 1 ≤ 0 and γ 1 + γ 2 ≤ 0 are linear in parameters, it is computationally straightforward to maximize a globally concave likelihood, such as probit or logit, subject to these constraints.
The above discussion also applies to semiparametric models where one need not specify the exact functional form of F (·). For example, the semiparametric method of Bhattacharya (2008) , which only utilizes the strict monotonicity of the CDF F (·), can be applied to estimate the binary choice model, subject to our sign restriction and standard scale-normalization, viz. γ 1 = −1 and γ 1 + γ 2 ≤ 0, i.e. using the specification thatq (p, y) is a strictly increasing function of the linear index −p + γ 2 y with γ 2 ≤ 1.
E. Random Coefficients: An alternative parametric specification in this context is a random coefficient structure, popular in IO applications. It takes the form Pr (1|price = p, income = y)
where γ 1 and γ 2 are now random variables with joint distribution G (·, ·, θ), indexed by an unknown parameter vector θ, and F (·) is a specified CDF (e.g. a logit). Theorem 1 then implies that the distribution G (·, ·, θ) must be such that the choice probability function H (·, ·, ·) satisfies
One way to guarantee this would be to specify the support of γ 1 and of γ 1 + γ 2 to lie in (−∞, 0). Using Theorem 1, a utility structure that would rationalize such a model is:
where V ≃ U (0, 1), and h (y − p, v, θ) is sup {x : H (x, y − p, θ) ≥ v}. 3 F. Counterfactuals: Theorem 1 can be used to nonparametrically predict theory-consistent choice probabilities on counterfactual, i.e. previously unobserved, budget-sets. Obviously, without shape restrictions, there is no nonparametric restriction on demand on counterfactual budgets. To see how to use shape-restrictions, let A denote the set of (p, y) observed in the data. Then, using part (i) condition (A) of our theorem, the probabilityq (p ′ , y ′ ) of buying at counterfactual (i.e. previously unobserved) price p ′ and income y ′ can be bounded as
The above calculation is extremely simple; for example, the lower bound requires collecting those observed budget sets (p, y) in the data that satisfy y ≥ y ′ , y − p ≤ y ′ − p ′ (a one-line command in STATA), evaluating choice probabilities on them, and sorting these values.
G. Welfare bounds: Given bounds on choice probabilities, one can obtain lower and upper bounds on economically interesting functionals thereof, such as average welfare. For example, the average compensating variation -i.e. utility preserving income compensation -corresponding to a price change from p 0 to p 1 at income y is given by
q (y + p − p 0 , y − p 0 ) dp (c.f. Bhattacharya, 2015) . 4 This requires prediction of demand on a continuum of budget sets, viz.
, it follows from our discussion above, and by Theorem 1, that pointwise bounds on q (y + p − p 0 , y − p 0 ) are given by
This implies that average CV at y is bounded below by
) dp, and above by
We can, in fact, make a stronger statement, viz., that the smallest set S (y, p 0 , p 1 ) containing all feasible values of the average CV, based on the restrictions of Theorem 1, is given by the interval
This assertion requires a justification, because I (y, p 0 , p 1 ) includes integrals of functions that violate the shape restrictions of Theorem 1 but nonetheless satisfy the pointwise bounds (10) . That justification is as follows. First note that by definition, the set S (y, p 0 , p 1 ) is given by 
. 5 We want to show that I (y, p 0 , p 1 ) = S (y, p 0 , p 1 ).
for each p, and I (y, p 0 , p 1 ) is a connected interval. 4 The results in Bhattacharya (2015) are stated in terms of the standard forms of choice probabilities, viz.
q (p, y) in our notation above. In particular, average CV is
(p, y + p − p0) dp which, in our present notation, is
q (y + p − p0, y − p0) dp. 5 The limit condition (B) in Theorem 1 can be dropped in defining S because y, p0, p1 are all finite.
has a solution (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ) in the unit positive simplex. Clearly, we need that π 2 + π 3 ≥ π 3 (guaranteeing π 2 ≥ 0) which is precisely our shape restriction q a 0 , a 1 1 ≥ q a 0 , a 2 1 (as a 1 1 > a 2 1 ). Similarly, by considering the budget sets p 1 , y 1 and p 2 , y 2 with y 1 < y 2 and y 1 − p 1 = y 2 − p 2 ≡ a 1 , say and a 1 0 ≡ y 1 < y 2 ≡ a 2 0 , one can show that our shape restriction q a 1 0 , a 1 ≥ q a 2 0 , a 1 (as a 1 0 < a 2 0 ) is necessary for the SRP condition analogous to (11) to have an admissible solution. With more budget sets, the corresponding higher dimensional matrix equations analogous to (11) quickly become operationally impractical and cumbersome, as is well-known in the literature (see introduction). In contrast, our shape-restrictions, by being global conditions on the q (·, ·) functions, remain invariant to which and how many budget sets are considered. Furthermore, we already know via Theorem 1 above, that these shape restrictions are also sufficient for rationalizability for any collection -finite or infinite -of budget sets. J. Endogeneity: Our results in Theorem 1 are stated in terms of structural choice probabilities q (·, ·). If budget sets are independent of unobserved heterogeneity (conditional on observed covariates), then these structural choice probabilities are equal to the observed conditional choice probabilities, i.e., q (a, b) = Pr (1|Y = a, Y − P = b) . 6 It does not seem possible to show directly, i.e. without using Theorem 1, that our shape restrictions are also sufficient for existence of admissible solutions to the analog of (11) corresponding to every arbitrary collection of budget sets. But given theorem 1, this exercise is probably of limited interest.
To date, all existing results on rationalizability of demand under heterogeneity, including McFadden and Richter, 1990, Lewbel, 2001 and Hausman-Newey, 2016 maintain independence. If the independence condition is violated (even conditional on observed covariates), then Theorem 1 continues to remain valid as stated, since it concerns the structural choice probability q (·, ·), but consistent estimation of q (·, ·) will be more involved. In applications, if endogeneity of budget sets is a potential concern, then it would be advisable to estimate structural choice-probabilities using methods for estimating average structural functions. A specific example is the method of control functions, c.f. Blundell and Powell, 2003 , which requires that η ⊥ (P, Y ) |V , where V is an estimable "control function" -typically a first stage residual from a regression of endogenous covariates on instruments.
